NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 84 | Number 1

Article 6

12-1-2005

Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal
Practices in the United States Supreme Court in
Light of Cheney v. United States District Court
Timothy J. Goodson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Timothy J. Goodson, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v.
United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 181 (2005).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol84/iss1/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in
the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. United
States District Court
INTRO D U CTIO N.......................................................................................
I.

II.

181

STANDARDS FOR RECUSAL IN THE UNITED STATES

SUPREM E COURT .........................................................................

186

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

187
191
192
193

Policies ...................................................................................
Statutory Standards...............................................................
The ABA Model Code of JudicialConduct .......................
P rocedure...............................................................................
Special Considerationsfor Recusal in the Supreme
Co urt ......................................................................................
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS TO CHENEY .............................
A. Bases for Recusal Addressed in Justice Scalia's
M em orandum........................................................................

195

198
199

1. Justice Scalia's Friendship with Vice President
C heney ........................................
199
2. Was the Flight a Disqualifying Gift? ............................ 202
3. Past Recusal Practices in the Supreme Court .............. 205
4. What Role Does Public Criticism Play in the
R ecusal D ecision? ...........................................................
207
B. The FundamentalProblem with Justice Scalia's
M em orandum........................................................................
III.

209

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING RECUSAL PRACTICES IN

THE SUPREME COURT .................................................................

213

A. Require Written Opinions on the Recusal Decision .......... 214
B. Subject the Recusal Decision to Review ............................ 1.217
C O N CLU SIO N ...........................................................................................

220

INTRODUCTION

Cheney v. United States District Court arose from the activities of

the National Energy Policy Development Group, a task force
established by President George W. Bush and chaired by Vice

1. 542 U.S. 367, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). Throughout the remainder of this Comment,
the Supreme Court Reporter is used for citations to the opinion on the merits in Cheney v.
United States District Court, because pinpoint citations to the United States Reports were
unavailable at the time of publication.
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President Richard Cheney.2 Even in its early stages, Cheney was
given prominent coverage by national media outlets.3 Legal scholars
focused on the important executive privilege issues presented by the

case, while pundits tracked its potential to impact the political
fortunes of the Bush administration.4 However, by the time the U.S.

Supreme Court heard Cheney,5 public debate over the merits of the

case was being drowned out by a far more audible dispute over the
propriety of Justice Scalia's participation in the case.6

The focus of that dispute was a duck hunting trip to Louisiana, in
which Justice Scalia was joined by Vice President Cheney in early
January 2004, while Vice President Cheney's appeal was pending
before the Court.7 In the face of mounting criticism from the national

2. Id. at 2582. Plaintiffs claimed that the group included de facto members from the
private sector, thus triggering the administration's duty to make certain disclosures under
the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Id. at 2583. Even at its early stages, the case was
given prominent coverage by the national media, largely because of the alleged ties
between the energy policy group and former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay. Judicial Watch,
Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2002). At trial, the
district court granted the plaintiff's "tightly-reined" discovery. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2584
(citing JudicialWatch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 54). The administration then sought a writ of
mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to vacate
the discovery order, which the court denied. Id. at 2584-85. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 540 U.S. 1088 (2003), to
determine whether mandamus was appropriate to modify discovery orders that might
interfere with the president's executive privilege, Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2582.
3. JudicialWatch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
4. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum
in the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETMCS 229, 232-33 (2004) ("[Tlhe issue is whether
Cheney, as chair of the advocacy group, has been lying about how the group was
constituted. That goes to Cheney's 'reputation and integrity' in the most significant way,
and is of particular importance to him in an election year."); Mark J. Rozell, Executive
Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403,
411-14 (2002) (reviewing the facts of Judicial Watch and speculating on possible outcomes
of an executive privilege claim); Carolyn Bingham Kello, Note, Drawing the Curtain on
Open Government? In Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 345, 392-93 (2003) (analyzing Judicial Watch and concluding that "[w]hile there may
be nothing wrong with a President making domestic policy recommendations received
directly from special interest groups, the public has a right to know when this occurs").
5. Oral arguments took place on April 27, 2004. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2576.
6. See Linda Greenhouse, Administration Says a 'Zone of Autonomy' Justifies Its
Secrecy on Energy Task Force, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 2004, at 16 ("By last month, when
Justice Scalia rejected a motion to recuse himself... the issues in the case had been all but
submerged in the recusal debate."); Charles Lane, High Court Hears Case on Cheney
Energy Panel; White House Argues for Confidentiality, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2004, at Al
("The complex legal issues in Cheney v. U.S. District Court ... have been overshadowed
in recent weeks by a related debate over Justice Antonin Scalia's refusal to recuse himself
from the case.").
7. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 914-15 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.)
(setting forth his account of the shared vacation that gave rise to the public controversy).
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media, Justice Scalia declined to recuse himself from the case. Sierra
Club, a plaintiff in the case, then filed a motion to recuse Justice
Scalia. 8 Sierra Club argued that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) mandated recusal
because the shared vacation created the appearance of partiality.9 As

evidence of the appearance of partiality, the motion cited editorials
calling for Justice Scalia's recusal in twenty of the nation's thirty
largest newspapers.10 Justice Scalia denied the motion in a twentyone-page memorandum" in which he pointed out several errors in the
newspaper accounts of his trip, 2 asserted that he received no
economic benefit from sharing transportation with Vice President
Cheney on the trip, 3 and concluded that the joint vacation afforded
no reasonable basis to question his impartiality. 4

In the months following Justice Scalia's memorandum, public
commentary on his refusal to recuse did not abate and remained
overwhelmingly critical. 5 From the time the story broke and despite
his repeated attempts to justify his actions, detractors have roundly
criticized Justice Scalia's participation in Cheney and have called his
personal morals into question. 6 The concern of this Comment,
however, is not what Cheney reveals about Justice Scalia's personal
moral virtue. Instead, this Comment examines Cheney to resolve

whether recusal practices in the Supreme Court are achieving the
goals of judicial impartiality and a public perception of that
8. Motion to Recuse, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004) (No. 03-475).
The term "recusal" historically referred to a judge's decision to step down from the bench
voluntarily, with "disqualification" standing for removal of a judge by constitutional or
statutory mandate.

RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION § 1.1, at 4-5

(1996). However, any distinction between the two terms has largely vanished and the
terms are now used interchangeably. Id.
9. Motion to Recuse, supra note 8, at 2-3.
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.).
12. Id. at 923-24.
13. Id. at 921.
14. Id. at 929.
15. See infra notes 165-67.
16. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 929 ("As the newspaper editorials appended to the
motion make clear, I have received a good deal of embarrassing criticism and adverse
publicity in connection with the matters at issue here .... "); see also infra notes 165-67. It
should be noted that it is possible to interpret the episode as highlighting Justice Scalia's
rectitude rather than casting a pall on it: by defending judicial independence from the
attacks of a few influential newspaper editors, Justice Scalia may have sacrificed his own
ambitions for the position of Chief Justice. See Michael A. Fletcher, Reid Says He Could
Back Scalia for Chief Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2004, at A4 (reporting Senate Minority
Leader Harry Reid's statement that his support for Justice Scalia as Chief Justice would
depend on Justice Scalia overcoming his "ethics problems," including his refusal to recuse
himself in Cheney); Editorial, The New Leader's Injudicious Start, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2004, at A40 (same).
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impartiality. This Comment also assesses how recusal practices can

be modified to more effectively serve those objectives.
Vice President Cheney ultimately prevailed in the Supreme
Court by a 7-2 vote. 7 The five-vote margin makes it clear that Justice
Scalia's participation in the case did not directly affect its outcome.
That fact, however, does not detract from the significance of the
recusal issue. Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse has a fundamental
importance independent of the specific outcome of Cheney, because

the case raised questions about the integrity of an institution that
relies on trust, confidence, and esteem for its legitimacy and
authority.18
Indeed, the Cheney episode seems to be illustrative of a rising

scrutiny of the extrajudicial activities of the Supreme Court Justices.
Justice Ginsburg has been criticized for her involvement with a
feminist group. 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist was disparaged for
accepting a flight from a corporation involved in litigation that could
appear on the Court's docket." Justice O'Connor has even been
chastised for her remarks at the funeral of President Reagan.21

17. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2582 (2004). The dissenters were
Justices Ginsburg and Souter. Id.
18. See Ronald J. Riccio, Subjecting War to the Law, N.J. L.J., July 26, 2004, § 3, at S-7.
Riccio notes:
This is why the Scalia recusal issue is not a trivial sideshow or merely fodder for
political cartoonists. A genuine and unquestioned commitment to a principled
legal analytic rather than personal ideological judgments, partisan politics, or
relationships is essential for the Court to sustain its legitimacy and indispensable if
the public is to have confidence and trust in the moral sanction of the Court's
decisions.
Id.
19. See, e.g., Peter S. Canellos, Outspoken Justices Cloud High Court's Appearance,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 2004, at A3 (criticizing Justice Ginsburg for refusing to recuse
herself from cases in which the National Organization for Women ("NOW") Defense
Fund took an interest, even though she had lent her name to their lecture series);
Editorial, The Mystique of Blind Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 18, 2004, at 8
(stating that Justices Scalia and Ginsburg have been criticized for supporting "politically
active groups that have taken an interest in cases pending before the court," such as the
conservative Urban Planning Council and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
respectively).
20. See Cragg Hines, Let's Keep Those Robes Out of the Mire, HOUSTON CHRON.,
May 19, 2004, at 24A (asserting that Chief Justice Rehnquist raised questions about his
impartiality when he accepted a flight on a jet that was owned by American Electric
Power, a Columbus-based utility in the midst of a clean-air suit that was brought by the
Environmental Protection Agency and could easily end up in the Supreme Court).
21. See Canellos, supra note 19 (asserting that Justice O'Connor's remarks are
indicative of an increasing trend toward the appearance of political bias on the Supreme
Court).
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Recent heightened attention to judicial ethics in the Supreme Court
may be traced back to Bush v. Gore,22 in which the Court's
impartiality was widely attacked.23
Justice Scalia's actions in Cheney and other complaints of
unethical judicial behavior have prompted congressional leaders to
threaten closer scrutiny of the judiciary.2'
For House Judiciary
Committee Chairman F. James Sessenbrenner, these instances have
raised "profound questions with respect to whether the judiciary
should continue to enjoy delegated authority to investigate and
discipline itself. '25
Responding to this criticism, Chief Justice
Rehnquist created a committee on judicial discipline and appointed
Justice Breyer as its chair.26 Though that committee is concerned
broadly with judicial ethics for all federal judges and its report is not
expected until summer of 2006,27 the congressional and public unease
counsels that the Court should revisit its own recusal practices in
order to preempt a legislative intrusion that may harm the Court's
independence. The development of recusal practices has historically
been motivated substantially by "political or public opinion jerks or
jumps from especially newsworthy episodes. 28 Cheney was certainly a
newsworthy episode, 29 and in combination with other indications of
the festering distrust of the Supreme Court's impartiality, it signals
that a new approach to recusal in the Court ought to be considered.
This Comment uses Cheney as a lens for examining what
improvements can and should be made to recusal practices in the
Supreme Court.
22. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
23. See Debra Lyn Bassett, JudicialDisqualificationin the Federal Appellate Courts,
87 IOWA L. REv. 1213, 1217 n.16 (2002) ("In perhaps the most publicized case involving
recusal issues, no Justice recused himself or herself from hearing Bush v. Gore, despite the
widely-perceived bias of the Court's Republican appointees."); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Can He
Be Recused?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 60 ("Underlying all this concern about a
duck-hunting trip is the lingering public distaste with the Court's ideologically split
decision in Bush v. Gore. Without question, that case represents a watershed in thinking
about the appearance of bias among members of the Court.").
24. See Tony Mauro, Rehnquist Tries to Build Bridges with Congress, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, June 7, 2004, at 4 (reporting comments of Representative Tom Feeney
and House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sessenbrenner); see also Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Scalia: Is Justice (Duck) Blind?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2004, at 8, 8 ("Sen.
Patrick Leahy, the senior Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, questioned the propriety
of the 'strange procedure' that lets the justice in question decide.").
25. Mauro, supra note 24, at 1, 13.
26. Id.; Riccio, supra note 18.
27. Mauro, supra note 24; Riccio, supra note 18.
28. John P. Frank, Conflict of Interest and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 18 AM. J.
COMP. L. 744, 744 (1970).
29. See infra notes 165-67.
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Part I provides an overview of judicial recusal law as it pertains
to the United States Supreme Court. This Part reviews the policy
objectives of recusal, summarizes the relevant statutes and canons of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, outlines the procedures for recusal, and
explains the special considerations that distinguish recusal in the U.S.
Supreme Court from recusal in lower courts.
Part II analyzes the central arguments in Justice Scalia's
memorandum in Cheney, and finds the memorandum to be, on the
whole, a defensible application of recusal law in the unique context of
the Supreme Court. Given the generally well-reasoned nature of the
memorandum, Part II argues that the widespread dissatisfaction with
Justice Scalia's participation in Cheney reveals a systemic flaw: the
problem lies not in Justice Scalia's decision itself, but in the
procedures by which the Supreme Court handles recusal decisions.
Part III proposes alternative procedures for recusal that would
protect the integrity of the nation's highest court while still allowing it
to function vigorously and independently. The proposal in Part III
requires Justices to write opinions giving reasons for their recusal
decisions both when parties move for recusal and when Justices
recuse themselves sua sponte. The proposal also provides for review
of a Justice's recusal decision by the full panel of the Supreme Court.
I. STANDARDS FOR RECUSAL IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT

The statute controlling the recusal decision in the Supreme Court
is 28 U.S.C. § 455.30 Section 455 requires recusal either when a
Justice's participation in the case would create an appearance of
bias,31 or when a Justice's associations match one of the statutory
In order to facilitate
provisions that establish actual bias.32
understanding the content of § 455, it is helpful to be familiar with the
policies that the statute is intended to effect. As such, this Part begins
with a discussion of the policies underlying recusal law.

30. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
31. See id. § 455(a) (requiring recusal from "any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned").
32. Id. § 455(b). See infra note 58 for the prohibited circumstances.
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Policies

The chief aim of recusal law is an impartial judiciary,33 a goal of
central importance in the American system of justice.3 4 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that an impartial tribunal is a
requirement of due process.
As a policy objective of the law of
recusal, impartiality has two components. First, judges must be free
of bias36 in order to ensure fairness to the litigants.37 Second, the

33. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that the Court cannot change the fact that "justice may appear imperfect to parties
and their supporters disappointed by the outcome... [but] can, however, enforce society's
legitimate expectation that judges maintain, in fact and appearance, the conviction and
discipline to resolve those disputes with detachment and impartiality"); Bassett, supra
note 23, at 1218 ("The aim of recusal and disqualification is to ensure both actual judicial
impartiality, which is a necessary prerequisite of due process, and the appearance of
impartiality, which is necessary to ensure confidence in the courts.").
34. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (1990) ("Our legal
system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will
interpret and apply the laws that govern us."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and
Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 596-97 (1987) ("The American judicial system proceeds
from the premise that its judges are impartial toward the litigants, disinterested in the
specific outcome of the case, and not personally involved in the matters that they
adjudicate.").
35. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986) (reviewing case law that
established that "under the Due Process Clause no judge 'can be a judge in his own case
[or be] permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome' ") (alterations in
original) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
46-47 (1975) ("[A] 'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' ")
(quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62
(1972) (holding that petitioner's due process rights were violated when his trial for traffic
violations was decided by the Mayor, who was responsible for the village's finances);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("[lIt certainly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject
his liberty or property to the judgment of a court[,] the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.").
36. It should be noted at the outset that the concept of "bias" does not extend to a
judge's views of the legal issues in the case. The bias must be personal in nature. See
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.04, at 113 (3d ed.
2000) ("Bias and prejudice are only improper when they are personal .... That a judge
has a general opinion about a legal or social matter that relates to the case before him or
her does not disqualify the judge from presiding over the case."). By way of example, it
would be improper to seek recusal of Justice Scalia in an abortion case on the grounds that
his previous opinions disclose an antipathy to constitutional protection of that practice.
37. See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisitions Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), where the
Court stated:
We conclude that in determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a
violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in
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court must be perceived to be impartial, thereby promoting public

confidence in the judiciary.3 8
Though the second component has been criticized as distracting
judges from the more fundamental concern of what justice requires,39

the Court has made clear that at stake in the perception of
impartiality is nothing less than the integrity of the judicial
enterprise.4 0 The rationale underlying the maxim that "justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done"4 1 is that the courts will not be viewed as a legitimate forum

for resolving disputes if the public does not believe in the neutrality of
its judges. Accordingly, the Court has extended due process
requirements to include the appearance of impartiality as well.4" The

goal of preserving legitimacy is of paramount importance for the
Supreme Court, which has no enforcement powers of its own, and
therefore must depend on the widely shared belief that its decisions
are legitimate to compel the other branches to carry out those
decisions.43

Another benefit of a recusal standard that requires the
appearance of impartiality is that it may be a more accurate method

for rooting out actual bias, given the psychological limitations of

other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial
process.
Id. at 864.
38. See id. ("We must continuously bear in mind that 'to perform its high function in
the best way[,] justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' ") (quoting Murchison, 349
U.S. at 136); Durhan v. Neopolitan, 875 F.2d 91, 97 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Section 455(a) of the
Judicial Code is aimed at avoiding the appearance of judicial partiality and resulting
general distrust by the public of the judicial system.").
39. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 237, 278 (1987) ("The reasonable-appearance-of-injustice test, however, distracts
judges, legislators, and commentators from clarifying what is and is not unjust ....The
appearance test invites judges to rest on appearances, instead of looking deeper.").
40. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining that appearances are of paramount importance because "the integrity of the
judicial system is at stake"); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
41. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 565 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Exparte McCarthy,
1 K.B. 256, 259 (1923)).
42. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("Moreover, even if there is no showing of
actual bias in the tribunal, this Court has held that due process is denied by circumstances
that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias.").
43. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34-35 (2d ed.

1988) (evaluating the Supreme Court's assertion of supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958), and pointing out that the president and Congress "possess the power to
develop interpretations of the Constitution which do not necessarily conform to" the
Court's).
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judges.' As professionals in maintaining neutrality and considering
only the relevant matters when rendering a decision, judges may be
disinclined to admit when their decision is improperly influenced or
biased." Indeed, scholars have questioned whether judges are even
capable of knowing when their decisions are biased.46 In light of these
questions, and the fact that the judge whose bias is being challenged is
the one who decides whether or not to disqualify himself, a standard
that focuses the inquiry on the appearance of impartiality is laudable
as an effective way of ensuring actual impartiality.47
Balanced against the goal of judicial impartiality is the competing
objective of judicial independence.4 8 An absolute preoccupation with
impartiality
and its appearance
would, counterintuitively,
49
compromise the neutrality of the judge. This is so because if judges
were expected to recuse themselves based on irrational or
unsupported conjecture of judicial bias, the parties in the litigation or
a vindictive press would be able to control the assignment of judges."
A judge whose participation is subject to unjustified removal by the
44. See Bassett, supra note 23, at 1250 ("[S]tudies of unconscious bias confirm the
observation that people who claim, and honestly believe, they are not prejudiced may
nonetheless harbor unconscious stereotypes and beliefs. Thus, although judges should be
constantly vigilant for potential biases and prejudices, they will not always recognize their
own biases and stereotypes.").
45. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Judges asked to recuse
themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards .... ").
46. See Bassett, supra note 23, at 1249-50 (relying on social science experimental
studies to argue in favor of a peremptory challenge to federal judges as a way of "tak[ing]
into account judges' inability to detect some unconscious biases").
47. Commentary on the policy of impartiality has long questioned whether such a goal
is possible, given that judges are human and fallible and thus incapable of absolute
impartiality. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

168 (1921) ("The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside
in their course, and pass the judges by."). However, even assuming, arguendo, the
impossibility of the goal, there is no reason why the law should not strive toward such an
ideal. The unattainability of an absolutely impartial judiciary does not undermine
impartiality as a model.
48. See United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (1986) (per curiam), where the
Court noted:
There are twin, and sometimes competing, policies that bear on the application of
the § 455(a) standard. The first is that courts must not only be, but must seem to
be, free of bias or prejudice .... A second policy is that a judge, having been
assigned to a case, should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation.
Id. at 1558.
49. See id. at 1558 ("If [recusal based on unsupported allegations of bias] occurred the
price of maintaining the purity of the appearance of justice would be the power of litigants
or third parties to exercise a veto over the assignment of judges.").
50. Id.
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parties or the press cannot be said to be neutral. In order to preserve
judicial independence, the law of recusal constrains the policy of
impartiality with the requirement that a charge of bias be supported
by facts,5" or that appearance of impartiality be evaluated from the
perspective of a reasonable observer.52
Another goal of recusal law that must be balanced against
judicial impartiality is judicial efficiency. Recusal at the district court
level and the court of appeals level necessitates the transfer of the
case to another judge. Such transfers are inefficient because they
cause delay and, if the recusing judge has already invested some time
into the case, a waste of judicial resources. 3 At the trial and
intermediate appellate levels, judicial efficiency is an important
consideration in the law of recusal. In the Supreme Court, a Justice's
recusal would not result in a case being transferred, because there is
no substitute for a Supreme Court Justice.54 Nonetheless, efficiency
may still be a consideration, as it is probably correct that the
involvement of fewer Justices in a case is less efficient than having the
Court's full judicial resources dedicated to the matter.

51. Id.
52. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (statement of
Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal) (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1988)). The reasonable observer is a person who is apprised of all the
material facts, including those not known by the general public. See FLAMM, supra note 8,
§ 5.8.1, at 170 ("Where a reasonable person knowing all the relevant facts and
circumstances would not harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality,
disqualification is generally deemed to be unwarranted.").
53. See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2000) ("In any event, the
unnecessary transfer of a case from one judge to another is inherently inefficient and
delays the administration of justice."); United States v. McLain, 701 F. Supp. 1544, 1556
(M.D. Fla. 1988) ("A busy district court cannot accept unwarranted recusals or changes in
judges' assignment; they place extra burdens on the other judges and waste judicial
resources.") (citation omitted).
54. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.)
(explaining why the doubts should not be resolved in favor of recusal in the Supreme
Court, even if that would be a sound policy for the courts of appeals).
55. One reply to this assertion is that decisions may come more easily to a group of
fewer Justices, since there are fewer people to disagree and negotiations can take place
more quickly. However, the "inefficiencies" that inhere in the size of the Court are
intentional and are a productive and useful part of the Supreme Court's decisionmaking
process.
The inconvenience and slowness of deliberating, discussing, persuading,
negotiating, and building a five-person consensus have benefits that recusal law should not
seek to eliminate. It is the fruitless use of judicial resources that concerns recusal law.
The efficiency consideration in the Supreme Court is distinct from the concern of
a split vote, which is addressed infra in Part I.E.
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Statutory Standards

As previously noted, disqualification of Justices in the United
States Supreme Court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455.56 Section 455
requires recusal in two situations. First, a Justice must disqualify
himself under § 455(a) from "any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."5 7 In other words, recusal is
mandatory when any fact reasonably suggests that a Justice appears
to lack impartiality. Second, recusal is mandatory when a Justice's
associations fall into one of the five circumstances enumerated in
§ 455(b).5 8 The prohibited circumstances include, inter alia, when the
Justice has served as a lawyer in the case, when the Justice has a
financial interest in the case, or when the Justice or his close relative
is a party, a lawyer, or a witness in the case.59 The circumstances

56. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000). There are two other statutes that control disqualification
in the federal courts. See id. §§ 47, 144. Section 47 prohibits a judge from hearing an
appeal from a case or issue tried by that judge. Id. § 47. Section 144 permits a party to
disqualify a judge by filing an affidavit stating that the judge is biased and giving facts and
reasons for that belief. Id. § 144. However, those statutes, by their own language, do not
apply to disqualification in the Supreme Court. Section 144 is explicitly limited to
"proceeding[s] in a district court." Id. Section 47, unlike § 455, extends only to judges and
not Justices. Compare id. § 47 ("No judge shall hear...") with id. § 455(a) ("Any justice,
judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself .....
57. Id. § 455(a).
58. The five circumstances in which a Justice must recuse himself are:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a
lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material
witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either
of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
Id. § 455(b).
59. See id.
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listed in § 455(b) are sufficient to establish that a Justice actually lacks
impartiality.' It is useful to think of the two parts of § 455 in terms of
their policy goals: § 455(b) is primarily concerned with ensuring a fair
hearing to the litigants by eliminating actual bias, while § 455(a) seeks
to protect public confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the
appearance of bias.61 Since bias may appear to exist where it does not
in fact exist, the broader of these two provisions is § 455(a).62 The
motion for recusal in Cheney based its argument solely on § 455(a).63
Because § 455(a) is focused on promoting public confidence in
the judiciary, the Court has held that its provisions are to be
evaluated on an objective basis, which means that what is relevant is
not the reality of bias but its appearance.' Further, appearances are
to be evaluated "from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is
'
informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances."65
Accordingly, if a fully informed observer could reasonably infer that a
Justice was partial, disqualification would be mandatory under
§ 455(a) even if the Justice harbored no bias and was capable of
deciding the case impartially.
The ABA Model Code of JudicialConduct
The American Bar Association ("ABA") promulgated its Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (the "Code") in order to "establish
standards for [the] ethical conduct of judges."' The Code carries no
authoritative weight of its own, instead serving as a model for statutes
and court rules.67 However, the Code has proved very influential in
C.

60. See United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[Section]
455(b) applies to instances in which the existence of specific circumstances suggest[s] the
fact of impartiality and thus mandate recusal .... [R]ecusal is mandatory when past or
present associations of the judge specifically enumerated in § 455(b) create the
presumption the judge lacks impartiality.").
61. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisitions Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988) ("The
very purpose of 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the
appearance of impropriety whenever possible."); Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325 (contrasting the
circumstances in which recusal is required by § 455(a) with those situations in which
§ 455(b) mandates recusal).
62. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 567 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. Motion to Recuse, supra note 8, at 2.
64. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.
65. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (statement of
Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal) (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1988)).
66. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (1990).
67. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.02, at 3 ("Both the 1972 and 1990 Codes

... are models only; they have no legal effect unless enacted as a statute or court rule
..

."

.
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the law of judicial ethics.6" The 1972 version of the Code was the
impetus for the appearances prong of 28 U.S.C. § 455.69 Before 1974,
disqualification under § 455 was very narrow, only prohibiting a judge
from hearing a case in which he had an interest or a relationship to a
party.70 When Congress rewrote § 455 in 1974, it broadened the
statute substantially and tailored the statute's language to closely
track the language of Canon 3C of the 1972 version of the Code.7 1
In the current version of the Code, Canon 3E addresses
disqualification.72 At this point, the Code adds little to the analysis of
recusal in the United States Supreme Court, because the language of
Canon 3E and § 455 are virtually identical. 73 However, the Code may
be helpful when, for instance, the ABA has issued an opinion that
anticipates the particular circumstance at issue in a case. In addition,
it is important to note the influence that the Code has traditionally
held, because it suggests an opportunity for the ABA to help shape
changes in recusal law as they become necessary.74
D. Procedure
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 144, the federal disqualification statute that
applies only to district court judges,7 5 § 455 contains no procedural

68. See FLAMM, supra note 8, § 23.6.1, at 679 ("The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
(1972) ... was subsequently adopted in whole or in part in virtually every American state
as well as in the District of Columbia.") (citations omitted); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note
36, § 1.02, at 5 ("The widespread adoption of one or the other of the two Codes [, the 1972
and 1990 versions,] provides a degree of uniformity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
forms the foundation for a national body of law concerning judicial conduct.").
69. See FLAMM, supra note 8, § 23.6.2, at 680-82 (explaining that the provision in the
present version of § 455 that disqualifies a judge when his impartiality could "reasonably
be questioned" originated in the 1972 version of the Code).
70. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994).
71. See FLAMM, supra note 8, § 23.6.2, at 681 (noting that this process of reconciling
the federal judicial disqualification statutory scheme with the then-current Code "was
completed with the enactment of the 1974 amendments to § 455, which altered the statute
to the point of virtual repeal by changing it to read substantially the same way as former
Canon 3C (now 3E) of the Code of Judicial Conduct").
72. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990).
73. Compare id. with 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000); see also Bassett, supra note 23, at 1230
("Despite the lack of inherent force behind the ethical codes, the provisions of Canons 3E
and 3F of the Model Code closely parallel those of § 455 .... ).
74. But see Bassett, supra note 23, at 1232 (arguing that courts have ignored the Code
standards and thereby have downplayed the significance of the appearance of
impropriety).
75. Section 144 requires that the affidavit alleging bias must be filed within ten days of
the beginning of the proceeding and must state facts and reasons for the belief that the
bias exists. A certificate by counsel stating that the affidavit is made in good faith is also
required. The statute also limits parties to one such affidavit per case. § 144.
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component to govern the enforcement of the statute's substance.7 6 As
a result, recusal procedure in the Supreme Court has evolved through
case law and pure inertia. One significant aspect of this is that much
of the practice of recusal in the Supreme Court could be altered by
the Court itself, without need for congressional action.77
Despite the lack of procedural guidance in the statute, it is well
established that a litigant may enforce § 455 through a motion made
directly to the allegedly disqualified Justice.7 8 Such a motion was the
impetus for Justice Scalia's memorandum in Cheney.79 However,

recusal need not be initiated by a party. In 1948, Congress converted
§ 455 into a "self-enforcing" provision.8" Thus, a Justice who is
disqualified under § 455 is required to recuse himself sua sponte.
Because of the esteem that practitioners before the Supreme

Court hold for the institution and its members, the long-standing
tradition of litigants is to presume that a Justice who should recuse

himself will do so. 81 Litigants' reticence to raise the issue of recusal is
compounded by the risk of angering or offending the Court, as well as
the fact that support for a recusal motion is often available only to the
affected Justice.8 2
The decision of whether a Justice is disqualified by § 455 is made
by the Justice in question.83 The most plausible rationale for this rule
76. Id. § 455; see also Bassett, supra note 23, at 1237-39 (detailing some of the
problems that have arisen in the federal circuit courts as a result of the lack of procedural
guidance from the statute).
77. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 643 (noting that "[c]hange could begin through an
internal rule promulgated by the Court itself").
78. See Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Section
455 is the statutory standard for disqualification of a judge. It is self-enforcing on the part
of the judge. It may also be asserted by a party by motion in the trial court, through
assignment of error on appeal, by interlocutory appeal, as here, or by mandamus.")
(internal citations omitted); Stempel, supra note 34, at 641 ("A litigant wishing to
challenge a Justice must make the disqualifying motion directly to the Justice under
attack.").
79. See Motion to Recuse, supra note 8.
80. See FLAMM, supra note 8, § 23.5.1, at 676 (explaining that one of the major
changes in the 1948 amendment was the elimination of the requirement that
disqualification be initiated by a party).
81. Stempel, supra note 34, at 598. However, see infra note 178 for cases where
parties did move to recuse a Justice.
82. Stempel, supra note 34, at 598-99.
83. See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1980) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.)
("[Glenerally the Court as an institution leaves [recusal] motions, even though they be
addressed to it, to the decision of the individual Justices to whom they refer .... ) (citing
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897 (1945) (denial of petition for
rehearing) (Jackson, J., concurring)); FLAMM, supra note 8, § 28.3.1, at 850-51 ("[Elach
Supreme Court Justice is, in essence, the authority of last resort on the question of his or
her own fitness to hear a given matter.") (citation omitted); Stempel, supra note 34, at 641

2005]

HUNTING FOR BETTER RECUSAL PRACTICES

195

is that the Justice whose actions are the subject of the recusal
question is the person who is most likely to be apprised of all the
relevant facts. It is rare for a Justice to write an opinion stating the
reasons for his recusal decision.'
Generally, the only external
indication of a judicial disqualification is a notation in the decision
that a certain Justice did not participate. 85 However, the same
notation is used when a Justice is unable to participate for any reason,
such as illness.8 6
Since, typically, no reasons are given for a Justice's
nonparticipation, even if it is known that a Justice recused himself in
a case, the case can offer no guidance for future recusal decisions.8 7
In addition, a Justice's recusal decision is final and not subject to
review.88 The result is a paucity of recusal case law to which Supreme
Court Justices are bound and by which litigants before the Court can
be guided in deciding whether to move for recusal.
E.

Special Considerationsfor Recusal in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court's unique position adds certain complications
to the recusal decision that are not present for the other federal
courts. However, with one possible exception, these considerations
do not urge a different recusal standard for the Supreme Court.8 9

("[R]ecusal decisions at the Supreme Court level are essentially the exclusive province of
the Justice asked to recuse himself or herself.").
84. Stempel, supra note 34, at 641. For instances in which a Justice did explain his
recusal position, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.);
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.,
respecting recusal); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 207 (1945) (statement of Jackson, J.,
respecting recusal).
85. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 598 n.41.
86. See id.
87. See Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari
Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REv. 657, 659 (1996) ("By tradition, most Supreme Court
Justices do not announce their reasons for recusal. It is therefore impossible to know with
any precision what the bases were for the great majority of these disqualifications.").
88. Stempel, supra note 34, at 641. Justice Jackson went so far as to say that the Court
did not have any authority to review a Justice's participation in a case. See Jewell Ridge,
325 U.S. at 897 ("There is no authority known to me under which a majority of this Court
has power under any circumstances to exclude one of its duly commissioned Justices from
sitting or voting in any case.").
89. The recusal standard discussed in this Part is § 455, which applies to all federal
judges. It was previously noted that there are two recusal statutes that apply in the lower
federal courts, but not to the Supreme Court. See supra note 56. This Part does not argue
that those statutes should not set up differences between the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts. Rather, it argues that § 455 should not apply differently to the Supreme
Court than to the lower federal courts.
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Rather, the complications only affect prudential considerations when

the existing § 455 standard is not met. Specifically, the Court's unique
position should make Justices unwilling to recuse themselves when
the legal standard does not demand recusal, but should not influence

the determination of whether § 455 mandates recusal.
The first complication introduced by the Supreme Court's
position is that, unlike in the district courts or circuit courts, there is
no substitute for a disqualified Supreme Court Justice.90 Thus, a
recusal by one of the Justices introduces the possibility that the
remaining Justices will split evenly in the decision.91 In the Supreme

Court, an equally divided vote automatically affirms the judgment of
the lower court. 2 For that reason, some have equated a Supreme
Court Justice's recusal with a vote against the petitioner. 93 However,
this characterization holds only for the immediate case and ignores

the precedential effect of the Court's decision. Though an even vote
affirms for the respondent in the instant case, it does not carry94 the
precedential weight of a majority decision by the Supreme Court.
It is important, then, to recognize the proper effect of this
consideration.

The fact that a split vote automatically affirms the

lower court is a valid reason for a Supreme Court Justice not to
recuse "out of an excess of caution," 95 but it does not mean that the
90. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.);
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.,
respecting recusal); FLAMM, supra note 8, § 28.3.1, at 850-51; Lubet, supra note 87, at 662
n.28.
91. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915-16 (memorandum of Scalia, J.); Microsoft, 530 U.S. at
1303 (statement of Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal); FLAMM, supra note 8, § 28.3.1, at
850-51.
92. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915-16 (mem. of Scalia, J.); Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1303
(statement of Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal); FLAMM, supra note 8, § 28.3.1, at 85051. For a dramatic illustration of this occurrence, see Beazley v. Johnson, 533 U.S. 969
(2001). In that case, three Justices recused themselves and the remaining Justices split on
the question of whether to stay the execution of a young black man who was sentenced to
death in Texas by an all white jury for the killing of a white businessman. The defendant
was seventeen years old at the time of the crime. The result of the split was that the stay
was not granted. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unexpectedly intervened
two days later and stayed the execution. See Bassett, supra note 23, at 1214-16.
In light of this consideration, seven Justices issued a joint press release in
November 1993 giving notice that "[a]bsent some special factor," those Justices would not
recuse themselves "by reason of a relative's participation as a lawyer in earlier stages of
the case." Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. 1,
1993), reprinted in FLAMM, supra note 8, app. A, at 1069.
93. See, e.g., Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916 ("Moreover, granting the motion [to recuse] is
(insofar as the outcome of the particular case is concerned) effectively the same as casting
a vote against the petitioner.").
94. FLAMM, supra note 8, § 28.3.1, at 851; Stempel, supra note 34, at 651.
95. Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 92.
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recusal standard itself should be different in the Supreme Court. In
other words, the standard remains the same for Supreme Court
Justices and other judges, and this consideration should only
influence Justices to hesitate in recusing themselves when recusal is
not required by that standard.
A second consideration for the Supreme Court is the added
strain on judicial independence caused by the Supreme Court's
inability to substitute for a disqualified Justice. One abiding concern
of recusal law is that parties may use recusal tactically to force out a
judge or justice whom they predict would be adverse to their case,
thus directly affecting the outcome.96 Because the recusal of a
Supreme Court Justice does not result in the reassignment of the case,
parties are not faced with uncertainty as to whether a recusal would
result in the assignment of a new Justice who is even more adverse to
their cause than the present one. As a result, the danger of parties'
tactical removal of a Justice may be more potent in the Supreme
Court than in other federal courts. Here again, this consideration
should not alter the recusal standard for the Supreme Court, rather it
merely makes it imprudent for a Justice to recuse out of an excess of
caution.
A third consideration setting recusal practices in the Supreme
Court apart is the increased likelihood that a Justice will be friends or
acquaintances of official parties in the cases. The Supreme Court
hears many cases in which an important executive branch official is a
party, and Justices are likely to know important politicians.9 7
Disqualifying Justices on the basis of their friendships with important
government officials would dramatically affect Court business.98
Since an entirely apolitical Court seems to be a practical impossibility,
this consideration may be a good reason to have a special rule for
recusal in the Supreme Court in cases involving friendships with
government officials. 99
96. See supra Part L.A (discussing policy goal of judicial independence in recusal law).
97. See Frank, supra note 29, at 745-48 (explaining that presidents tend to select
Supreme Court appointments from their closest and most trusted advisors); see also In re
Mason, 916 F.2d 385, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Politics plays a role in appointment to judicial
office .... Merit selection of federal judges means selection from among a group that
rises to attention on other grounds-grounds not exclusively political, but often so.");
Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 739 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1984)
("It is common knowledge, or at least public knowledge, that the first step to the federal
bench for most judges is either a history of active partisan politics or strong political
connections or... both.").
98. Cf. Mason, 916 F.2d at 387 ("There are not enough political eunuches [sic] on the
federal bench to resolve all cases with political implications .....
99. See infra Part II.A.1.
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II. APPLICATION OF STANDARDS TO CHENEY

It is highly unusual for a Supreme Court Justice to write an
opinion giving reasons for his refusal to recuse, as Justice Scalia did in
Cheney. 1" Because Justice Scalia defended his decision with a written
opinion, Justice Scalia's memorandum carries some degree of
weight.101 Thus, the memorandum should be evaluated not only as a
resolution of the particular facts of Cheney, but as a rare statement of
the modern standards and practices of recusal in the Supreme Court.
This Part analyzes the central arguments in Justice Scalia's
memorandum and argues that, for the most part, the memorandum
faithfully applied recusal law. Given the generally well-reasoned
nature of the memorandum, this Part argues that the widespread
dissatisfaction with Justice Scalia's participation in Cheney reveals a

systemic flaw in the Supreme Court's procedures for making recusal
decisions.
The facts reported in the memorandum serve as the basis for this
analysis. According to the memorandum, the invitation for the
Louisiana duck hunting trip was extended by Justice Scalia to Vice

President Cheney, on behalf of Justice Scalia's friend, Wallace
Carline, who would be their host for the trip.1" Justice Scalia offered
100. See supra Part I.D. Cases other than Cheney in which a Justice did give reasons
for his refusal to recuse are Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000)
(statement of Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal) (declining to recuse when Chief Justice
Rehnquist's son was a partner in the firm that represented a litigating party); Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.) (denying recusal motion when
Justice Rehnquist had testified before Congress about a domestic surveillance program,
the constitutionality of which was being challenged in the case at bar). For a case in which
a Justice explained why he agreed to recuse himself, see Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 207 (1945) (statement of Jackson, J., respecting recusal) ("This case was
instituted in June of 1939 and tried in December of that year. In January 1940, I became
Attorney General of the United States and succeeded to official responsibility for it. This
I have considered a cause for disqualification .... ") (citations omitted).
These cases are not discussed at length in this Comment because they shed little
light on the present state of recusal law in the Supreme Court. Both Schneiderman and
Laird predated the current version of § 455, the controlling statute for recusal in the
Court. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's participation in Laird v. Tatum seems to have been
part of the impetus for the 1974 amendment to § 455. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 594
("The reformist tide [to amend § 455 to impose a stricter, more comprehensive and
objective standard for judicial disqualification] was given additional force by Justice
Rehnquist's participation in Tatum.").
101. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 595 (noting that Justice Rehnquist's memorandum
refusing to recuse in Laird v. Tatum "still possessed doctrinal impact" despite being
objectionable on several grounds). However, because the decision was unreviewed, was
made by one Justice rather than a panel of Justices, and was potentially self-interested, the
memorandum should not be accorded the weight of Supreme Court precedent. See infra
Stempel, supra note 34, at 607; Part II.C.
102. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.).
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to invite Vice President Cheney when he learned that Carline, who
owns a business in the oil industry, was an admirer of the Vice
President." 3 After Vice President Cheney accepted the invitation, it
was agreed that Justice Scalia, his son, and his son-in-law would fly
with Vice President Cheney on his government jet."° The trip was
planned before the Court had granted certiorari in Cheney." There
were thirteen hunters on the trip, Justice Scalia was never alone with
Vice President Cheney, and they never discussed the case. °6 Vice
President Cheney left after two days, while Justice Scalia, his son, and
his son-in-law stayed on for four days, returning to Washington on a
commercial flight.107
A.

Bases for Recusal Addressed in Justice Scalia's Memorandum

The most significant issues raised by the recusal motion and
addressed in Justice Scalia's memorandum are discussed below.
Specifically, this Section addresses Justice Scalia's friendship with
Vice President Cheney, the shared flight as a disqualifying gift, the
decisions of past Supreme Court Justices in similar circumstances, and
the role of public disapproval in the recusal analysis.
1. Justice Scalia's Friendship with Vice President Cheney
After noting that recusal is required under § 455(a) if his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, Justice Scalia wrote that
the only possible basis for an appearance of bias arising from the trip
is that it suggests a friendship between Justice Scalia and Vice
President Cheney.1 8 However, Justice Scalia held that
while friendship is a ground for recusal of a Justice where the
personal fortune or the personal freedom of the friend is at
issue, it has traditionally not been a ground for recusal where
official action is at issue, no matter how important the official
action was to the ambitions or the reputation of the
Government officer. 0 9
The memorandum took issue with the assertion in the recusal
motion that the case was not a "run-of-the-mill" challenge to an
administrative decision because Vice President Cheney's own
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 914-15.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916.
Id.
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conduct was central to this case, which placed the Vice President's
"reputation and his integrity on the line." ' To the contrary, Justice
Scalia urged, the legal issues in the suit had no bearing on Vice
President

Cheney's

reputation and integrity."'

Justice Scalia

conceded that the case may have political consequences for the Vice
President, but

[t]o expect judges to take account of political consequencesand to assess the high or low degree of them-is to ask judges
to do precisely what they should not do. It seems to me quite
wrong (and quite impossible) to make recusal depend on what
degree of political damage a particular case can be expected to
inflict." 2
Some forceful critiques of this portion of Justice Scalia's
memorandum are available. One glaring deficiency is that Justice
Scalia cited no authority for a central premise of this decision, his
assertion that the dispositive factor in friendship cases is whether the
case involves the friend's personal fortune or freedom." 3 Further,
such a rule assumes a dichotomy between personal and official
interests that may not exist."' Indeed, some commentators have
plausibly surmised that the stakes in this suit for Vice President
Cheney's personal interests were much higher than they would have
been in a suit involving a small amount of his personal financial
interests."1 Finally, Justice Scalia's dichotomy goes against the grain

110. Motion to Recuse, supra note 8, at 9.
111. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 920 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
112. Id.
113. However, as will be argued in Part III, this shortcoming is more fairly attributable
to the paucity of authority on the subject than to Justice Scalia's opinion individually.
114. See Jeffrey Rosen, Quiet Please, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 5, 2004, at 14, 14 ("In fact,
the line between Cheney's personal and official capacity is hardly as bright as Scalia
suggests-thanks largely to the Republican assault on executive privilege during the
Clinton years."); Robert Solomon, Powers Separation a Cause for Pause, CONN. L. TRIB.,
May 10, 2004, at 18 ("The case involves the conduct of the vice president's Energy
Commission and the notion of Dick Cheney as not being personally involved is
ludicrous."); Taylor, supra note 24, at 8 ("[M]ost ethicists say this case raises questions
about Cheney's personal judgment and conduct: the vice president has a major political
stake in the outcome.").
115. See, e.g., Martin Dyckman, Editorial, Eroding Our Trust in the High Court, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Apr. 4, 2004, at 3P, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library. Some of the reasons that such a hypothesis seemed plausible were the
prominence of the litigation in the national media, the damage that could have been done
to Vice President Cheney and the Bush administration if the allegations in the suit (that
former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay was a member of the task force) were proven to be true,
and the imminence of the next presidential election.
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on
of the general rule that the recusal decision does not11 depend
6

whether the interest at issue is economic or noneconomic.

Despite these shortcomings, Justice Scalia's bright-line rule is

defensible as a pragmatic approach that is consistent with both the
case law and the policies of recusal law. Even outside the Supreme

Court, friendship between a judge and a litigating party has seldom
been grounds for judicial disqualification."' Part of the reason for
this may be that judges have a constitutionally protected freedom of

association, and recusal law is therefore reluctant to interfere with
judges' social lives." 8

Indeed, a rule requiring judges to sever all

social ties upon elevation to the bench would quite likely hamper
their effectiveness as judges." 9
Justice Scalia's rule balances the need for impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality against the realities of the Supreme
Court's unique position. A recusal rule that has Justices consulting
public opinion polls every time the Court hears a case involving or
116. Cf. In re Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The
interest described in § 455(b)(5)(iii) includes noneconomic as well as economic interests."
(citing Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980))).
117. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding the
trial judge's refusal to recuse himself when his former law clerk was a party and had
threatened to use his influence with the judge); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of recusal motion where judge had "a long-term working
relationship with a large majority of the defendants"); United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d
811, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding refusal to recuse where judge had a social
relationship with victims of defendants' crimes, but that relationship had ended seven
years prior to proceeding); Vieux Carre Prop. Owners v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1436, 1448 (5th
Cir. 1991) (upholding refusal to recuse where judge had close personal relationship with
mayor in a case in which the city was a party and the mayor had a significant political stake
in the project at issue in the suit); see also United States v. Leisure, 377 F.3d 910, 916 (8th
Cir. 2004) ("Previous contact between judge and litigant in an unrelated context is not
grounds to disqualify a judge.
); In re Executive Office of President, 215 F.3d 25, 2526 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying a motion to recuse where the case involved the conduct of
the President who had appointed the judge); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ.,
902 F.2d 1289, 1289-92 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining to recuse even though judge's personal
friends had a financial interest in the subject matter of the case). But see Moran v. Clarke,
296 F.3d 638, 649 (8th Cir. 2002) (remanding to district court for further consideration of
recusal request because "[t]he image of one sitting in judgment over a friend's affairs
would likely cause the average person in the street to pause"); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note
36, § 4.15, at 137 ("Whether or not disqualification is required when a friend appears as a
party to a suit before a judge depends on how personal the relationship is between the
judge and the party.").
118. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 36, § 10.42, at 362.
119. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Foreword to LESLIE W.

ABRAMSON,

JUDICIAL

x-xi (2d ed.
1992) ("Involvement in the outside world enriches the judicial temperament, and enhances
a judge's ability to make difficult decisions. As Justice Holmes put it, 'the life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.' ").
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
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affecting an administration official with whom they are friends is not
a workable solution. Friendships between Supreme Court Justices
and holders of high political office have always existed, and recusal
practices simply must account for this reality. 2 ' The rule on which
Justice Scalia based his decision may not remove all undesirable bias,
as Justices may favor the interests of their friends. However, the
elimination of that potential bias by requiring recusal based on a
Justice's friendship with an administrative official could be, in Scalia's
phrase, "utterly disabling" to the Court's business.121
2. Was the Flight a Disqualifying Gift?
In response to the recusal motion's argument that Justice Scalia's
flight to Louisiana with Vice President Cheney on Air Force Two was
a disqualifying gift, 2 2 Justice Scalia's memorandum gave three
reasons why the flight was a permissible social courtesy rather than a
disqualifying gift. First, Justice Scalia argued, the shared flight with
Vice President Cheney was not a gift because it cost the government
nothing."2 Second, Justice Scalia, his son, and son-in-law saved no
money as a result of the flight since they bought round-trip tickets for
their return trip to Washington anyway. 4 Third, the reason they
traveled with Vice President Cheney was not to save money but for
purposes of convenience."lz The gift analysis is the most troublesome
portion of Justice Scalia's memorandum on several grounds.
It is well established in the law of recusal that the proper
measure of a gift is whether the thing has value, 26 not whether it cost
the giver anything. Thus, it is irrelevant whether the flight cost
anything to the government or to Vice President Cheney. The
relevant point is that it held a value for Justice Scalia. By Justice
Scalia's own account, it did have a value because it "avoid[ed] some
120. Justice Scalia went so far as to say that "[m]any Justices have reached this Court
precisely because they were friends of the incumbent President or other senior officials."
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.).
121. Id.
122. Motion to Recuse, supra note 8, at 6.
123. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 920-21 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
124. Id. at 921.
125. Id.
126. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D)(5)(d) cmt. 1 (1990)
("A gift to a judge ...that is excessive in value raises questions about the judge's
impartiality and the integrity of the judicial office and might require disqualification of the
judge where disqualification would not otherwise be required."); see also FLAMM, supra
note 8, § 6.2.4, at 178 ("The guiding precept of the Code is that while a judge is not
permitted to accept 'valuable' gifts or favors from attorneys, he may accept 'mere social
hospitality' from them." (citations omitted)).
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inconvenience" to him and "considerable inconvenience" to his
friends.12 7 The proposition that there was no gift because the flight
was shared for purposes of convenience rather than to save money is
unpersuasive. The flight with Vice President Cheney had value for
Justice Scalia, his son, and son-in-law, whether the value is cast in
terms of saved money or enhanced convenience.
The fact that Justice Scalia's son and son-in-law flew in Vice
President Cheney's jet should also be considered in the analysis. In
the provision prohibiting acceptance of gifts, the Code states that the
judge "shall urge members of the judge's family residing in the
judge's household" not to accept gifts. 28 Presumably, Justice Scalia's
"married son 1' 29 and son-in-law do not reside in Justice Scalia's
household. Nonetheless, the fact that the invitation was extended to
two persons with such a close relationship to Justice Scalia adds to the
appearance of impropriety. 130
Next, it is doubtful that Justice Scalia's purchase of a round-trip
ticket sanitized the gift. The flight with Vice President Cheney had
valuable advantages over the commercial ticket that Justice Scalia
purchased. Flying in Vice President Cheney's jet was more
comfortable than coach in a commercial airliner. 3 ' In addition, the
flight with Vice President Cheney relieved Justice Scalia of the
expense and inconvenience of transportation from New Orleans,
where his commercial flight would have arrived, to Patterson, where
the flight with Vice President Cheney arrived. 32
Justice Scalia attempted to justify his acceptance of the flight by
pointing out that courtesies from government officials to Justices,
such as dinner invitations, are commonplace. 3 3 He surmised that the
value of his flight was likely lower than the value of dinner at the
White House, which would be proper.'3 4 This justification does not
serve. Social courtesies are acceptable not simply because their value
is negligible, but also because they are commonplace and avoidable
only at great cost to the freedoms and social lives of judges. 35 The

127. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 921 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
128. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 4(D)(5) (1990).

129. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 921 n.2 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).

131. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 921 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
132. Id. at 915, 921.

133. Id. at 921.
134. Id.
135. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 36, § 7.28, at 252 ("[I]t is quite undesirable to
preclude judges from accepting innocent invitations ....Consequently, the Code actually
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acceptable social courtesies from administrative officials to Justices
do not set a bar for de minimis gifts, below which anything goes.
Otherwise, it would be acceptable for Vice President Cheney to
simply give Justice Scalia an amount of money less than the auction
value of dinner at the White House. Clearly, such an action would
not be countenanced by recusal law.136

Justice Scalia likened his flight with Vice President Cheney to the
frequent invitations of shared transportation extended to members of
Congress by the executive branch.'37 His analogy is misleading
because there is no need for members of Congress to be impartial or
appear impartial toward an executive official. A Justice who has a
case before him involving that official, however, is required to be and
appear impartial toward the official and is thus subject to different
standards.138
There is ambiguity inherent in a standard that carves out an
exception to the prohibition on gifts for "ordinary social hospitality,"
but does not define that term.'39 As such, the gift/social hospitality

analysis relies on common sense and ordinary usage to balance a
Justice's legitimate interest in carrying on social relationships against
the appearance of impropriety.140 When a Justice is accepting from a
pending litigant a flight to a shared vacation, the gift seems a long way
from what the Code drafters envisioned for an ordinary social
hospitality. 41 Justice Scalia's memorandum attempted to argue that
usage in the Supreme Court has defined acceptance of flights from
government officials as proper, but it failed to clearly establish that
such a practice is entrenched or generally accepted by the Court.
This is a portion of the opinion that would have been more credible if
the source of the information about generally accepted practices on

bars a very small class of loans, gifts, and favors, while allowing wide latitude to ordinary
social hospitality.").
136. See In re Morrissey, 313 N.E.2d 878, 881-82 (Mass. 1974) (disciplining a judge for
accepting money gift from a litigant whose case was pending).
137. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 921 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
138. Namely, the recusal standards. See supra Part I (outlining the recusal standards as
they pertain to the U.S. Supreme Court).
139. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D)(5)(c) (1990) (listing

"ordinary social hospitality" but not explaining its definition).
140. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 36, § 7.28, at 252.
141. See E.W. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 8485 (1973) (noting that the drafters of the Code "felt that there are common sense limits
and that the standard is understandable and defensible; for example, the offer to a judge
of a month at the mountain cabin of a lawyer friend who practices in the judge's court is
clearly not ordinary social hospitality, and acceptance is prohibited." (quoted in SHAMAN
ET AL., supra note 36, § 7.28, at 252 n.258)).
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the Supreme Court had been someone other than the Justice whose
impropriety was at issue.
3. Past Recusal Practices in the Supreme Court
Justice Scalia's memorandum found the recusal motion deficient
because the motion failed to cite any cases with parallel facts in which
a Supreme Court Justice recused himself. 1412 Justice Scalia then
defended his participation by pointing to two instances in which a
Supreme Court Justice vacationed with an administration official
while the official's case was pending and the Justice did not recuse

himself.'43 In January 1963, Justice Byron White joined Attorney
General Robert Kennedy on a ski vacation while two cases were

pending in which Kennedy, in his official capacity, was a party. 144 In
April 1942, Justice Robert Jackson spent the weekend with President
Franklin D. Roosevelt while Wickard v. Filburn,'145 a case of great
146
importance to the President, was pending.

Some commentators have criticized this portion of Justice
Scalia's memorandum by pointing out other instances in the Supreme
Court's history when Justices were far more sensitive to the
appearance of bias. 147 The more salient critique is that for several
reasons, historical recusal decisions of Supreme Court Justices are
simply not very helpful to the modern recusal analysis.
First, historic recusal practices are not very informative because
Justices do not generally give reasons for their recusal decisions. 48
Since we are seldom told why a Justice recused himself or decided

against recusal, we cannot evaluate whether that decision is worthy of

142. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 922 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
143. Id. at 924-26.
144. Id. at 924-25.
145. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
146. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 925-26 (mem. of Scalia, J.). Wickard was important to
President Roosevelt because the constitutionality of much of his New Deal legislation
depended on Wickard's reading of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 250-55 (2d

ed. 2002).
147. For example, Justice Thurgood Marshall recused himself in all cases that involved
the NAACP because of his previous service as the general counsel of that organization.
See Stempel, supra note 34, at 624. In another instance, Chief Justice Taft divested himself
of a valuable annuity left to him by Andrew Carnegie because he was "profoundly
concerned that the usefulness and influence of the Court should not be lessened on this
account...." See Frank, supra note 28, at 744 (quoting A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFr 274 (1964)).
148. See supra Part I.D.
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being followed. 14 9 The fact that Justices do not usually write opinions

justifying their recusal decisions also means that it is unfair to expect
a recusal movant to point to specific instances where Justices recused
themselves for the same reason being argued. For that reason, Justice
Scalia's criticism of the recusal motion for the paucity of Supreme
Court case law therein is unfair. Indeed, Justice Scalia cited no case

law supporting the central legal premise of his memorandum. 150
Furthermore, historical practices are unhelpful because much of
the Supreme Court's handling of recusal, including the two instances
discussed by Justice Scalia's memorandum, preceded the current

version of the federal statute governing recusal in the Supreme
52
Court.'51 In 1974, § 455 was amended and broadened substantially.
Because of its broader reach, many of the recusal decisions of
Supreme Court Justices before 1974 would not pass muster under the
present version of the statute. 5 3 Thus, any analysis based on the
recusal decisions of Justices predating the 1974 amendment is
potentially misleading.
Historical recusal practices should not be given the weight of

precedent for the additional reason that they were not decided by a
disinterested panel.' Recusal decisions are made individually by the
Justice and are not subsequently reviewed. 5 5 The value of recusal
decisions is reduced by the potential for self-interest as well as the
fact that they are never subjected to review. Indeed, in the two cases
that Justice Scalia cited, the participation of the Justices was never
challenged and the Justices therefore never made a formal decision

149. See infra Part III.A (proposing that Supreme Court Justices write opinions
defending their recusal decisions in order to address this concern).
150. See infra Part III.A (noting that Justice Scalia gives no legal support for his
proposition that recusal is not required when a Justice's friend has an official interest,
rather than a personal one).
151. See supra Part I.B (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000), the statute governing recusal
in the Supreme Court).
152. See FLAMM, supra note 8, § 23.6.3, at 682 ("Prior to 1974, § 455 had consisted of
little more than the then-current version of the 1821 prohibition against a judge presiding
over any case in which he held an interest or was related to a party; the 1974 revision to
§ 455 resulted in massive changes." (footnotes omitted)).
153. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 608-28 (reviewing participation in cases of
historical Supreme Court Justices, including Justices Holmes, Black, and Vinson, that
would likely violate modern recusal standards).
154. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 607-08 ("[T]he past recusal practices of Justices do
not deserve the deference normally accorded case precedents. The latter result from
procedurally rigorous adjudication and decision by a neutral judicial body with a record of
its proceedings. The former result from an individual Justice's private, unreviewed, and
potentially self-interested determination.").
155. See supra Part I.D.
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about recusal. The mere fact that the Justices participated in those
cases does not make their participation proper. And the fact that the
judiciary has misbehaved historically does not justify continued
misbehavior. Furthermore, by basing his recusal decision in part on
those historical actions, Justice Scalia to some degree puts the Court's
imprimatur on those activities.156 The standard for recusal should not
be defined by the actions of Justices that may have been unethical to
begin with.
4. What Role Does Public Criticism Play in the Recusal Decision?
The recusal motion cites editorials at length in order to support
its argument that the shared duck hunting trip created an appearance
of 'partiality on the part of Justice Scalia.'57 Responding to these
arguments, Justice Scalia held that the editorials should not carry any
weight because they were based on erroneous facts 15 8 and basing

recusal decisions on the opinions of newspaper editors would give the
press a veto power over a Justice's participation in a case.59

Justice Scalia's concern about a veto power by the press is rooted
in a commitment to judicial independence, which has long been a
defining policy of recusal law. 160

Indeed, case law specifically

supports the proposition that erroneous media accounts cannot be
allowed to dictate the recusal decision.16 ' Courts have also rejected

the argument that newspaper reporting-even accurate reporting-of
a judge's decision not to recuse himself does not disqualify the judge
156. Even though recusal decisions from Supreme Court Justices might not be worthy
of authoritative status for the reasons being given, courts and scholars have, in the past,
relied on them as authoritative interpretations of the law of recusal. See Stempel, supra
note 34, at 595 (noting that despite the impropriety of Justice Rehnquist's actions in Laird
v. Tatum, his "memorandum still possessed doctrinal impact, making its way into some
legal texts as a summary of Supreme Court recusal practice and by lower courts for its
endorsement of a judicial 'duty to sit' "(footnote omitted)).
157. Motion to Recuse, supra note 8, at 3-5.
158. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 922-24 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.).
159. Id. at 926-27.
160. See supra Part I.A (outlining the policies of recusal law).
161. United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986). The court
stated:
Although public confidence may be as much shaken by publicized inferences of
bias that are false as by those that are true, a judge considering whether to
disqualify himself must ignore rumors, innuendos, and erroneous information
published as fact in the newspapers ....
To find otherwise would allow an
irresponsible, vindictive or self-interested press informant and/or an irresponsible,
misinformed or careless reporter to control the choice of judge.
Id. (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981)).
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by virtue of a public perception of bias. 6 2 These cases are in keeping
with the appearances standard of § 455(a), because that statute does
not ask whether the public actually questions the judge's impartiality.
Rather, the inquiry is whether a neutral observer, apprised of all the
material facts, would reasonably question the judge's impartiality.'63
Thus, even where media accounts manifest a public perception of the
judge's impartiality, that perception must be reasonable in order for
the judge to be disqualified under § 455(a). Further, where the public
is not apprised of all the material facts, their opinion about the
judge's impartiality is unhelpful to the § 455(a) inquiry.
According too great a weight to media accounts may, as Justice
Scalia argued, "give elements of the press a veto over participation of
...Justices."" 4 The independence of the Court requires that the
participation of Justices not be subject to the whims of certain
influential editors. On the other hand, a reluctant Justice should not
be able to avoid recusal where it would be proper simply because the
national media is urging that course. Moreover, public response, as
manifested in the national media, should have some place in the
§ 455(a) analysis. When the public is substantially informed about the
facts of the Justice's involvement, public opinion can serve as a
counterweight to the natural and sometimes unreasonable tendency
of Justices to find that their own impartiality cannot reasonably be
questioned. 65 Thus, though public opinion and media accounts
should not be given dispositive weight, Justices should consider them
in evaluating the appearance of bias, particularly when the public
opinion is widespread, largely uniform in its disposition, and
substantially informed by accurate reporting about the facts of the
Justices' participation.
In Cheney, Justice Scalia had good reason to be dismissive of the
criticism in the press of his participation because much of this

162. See Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The
fact that the judge's decision [not to recuse] was reported in the newspapers is not
persuasive of a public impression of partiality." (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160,
1168 (6th Cir. 1987); FLAMM, supra note 8, § 5.7.2, at 168 ("It is generally agreed ... that
media reports that suggest judicial impropriety or bias cannot act as a barometer of the
reasonable person's standard, particularly where it appears that erroneous information has
been published as fact ....
" (footnote omitted)).
163. See supra Part I.B (explaining the reasonable observer standard under § 455(a)).
164. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 927 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
165. See infra Part III.B (arguing that this tendency is one reason why recusal decisions
should be reviewed by the full panel of the Court).
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criticism was based on inaccurate reporting of the circumstances of
the trip. 66
B.

The FundamentalProblem with Justice Scalia's Memorandum

As the analysis above shows, Justice Scalia's decision not to
recuse was defensible on several grounds.
With the possible
exception of the "gift" portion of the memorandum, his opinion
relied on principles and policies that are well established in recusal
law. From the perspective of recusal law, then, what is perhaps most
unsatisfactory about Cheney is that in the aftermath of a generally
well-reasoned memorandum, the public response has been strident,
sustained, and almost uniformly critical.167 The detractors have
166. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 923-24 (mem. of Scalia, J.) (pointing out the erroneous
facts reported in several press accounts).
167. See, e.g., Editorial, Caesar's Wives, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 2004,
at A16 ("Many critics have called on Scalia to recuse himself, and although Scalia is a
personal friend of the lead attorney on the opposite side as well, he might have been wise
to do so."); Editorial, Cheney Should Answer Questions on Energy, DENVER POST, June
28, 2004, at B-07 ("Scalia had no business participating in the case ....
");Editorial,
Constitution: Scalia May Love It, But Live It?, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Apr.
9, 2004, at 12A, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("How can he rule
impartially accepting favors from the defendant? Yet, he refuses to step down. How can
the public have confidence in the judiciary with such ongoing conduct?"); Martin
Dyckman, Editorial, Eroding Our Trust in the High Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Apr. 4, 2004, at 3P, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("Scalia enriches the
literature of jurisprudence nearly every time he writes, but his 21-page memorandum
refusing to recuse himself from the Cheney case was more a masterpiece of propaganda
than of law."); Larry Fahn, Future Generations Be Damned! The Sorry Environmental
Legacy of the Bush Administration, TIKKUN, May 1, 2004, at 29 ("Notwithstanding the
clear appearance of a conflict, Justice Scalia refused to recuse himself."); Editorial, Fight
to Protect Open Secret Only Raises More Suspicions, U.S.A. TODAY, June 25, 2004, at 8A
("[J]udges are supposed to avoid contact outside the court with parties to cases before
them, but Scalia defiantly refused to recuse himself ....By ignoring appearances, Scalia
looks as though he is using his position to help out an old friend."); Ernst-Ulrich Franzen,
Editorial, Making Sausage in Secret, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 25, 2004, at 18A,
available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("[Scalia's] opinion only reaffirms that the
hunt was a bad idea .... He should have recused himself."); Richard F. Friedman,
Editorial, Scalia Should Not Help Decide Cheney Case, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 24, 2004, at
9A ("Justice Scalia has defended his nonrecusal vigorously, but by sitting on the case he
risks creating [an] appearance of impropriety ....); Cragg Hines, Editorial, Scalia's
Ducking of Recusal Injures Court, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 21, 2004, at 2 ("Scalia's
decision runs counter to both the judicial code ...and federal law ....); Marianne M.
Jennings, Kerrys and Justices Adrift on a Sea of Complexity, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City), Mar. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("Scalia
defiantly refuses to recuse himself from the case despite what looks like a conflict, smells
like a conflict and quacks like a conflict."); Editorial, JudicialEthics Under Review, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A28 ("There was widespread outrage when word got out that
Justice Antonin Scalia had gone duck hunting with Vice President Dick Cheney while Mr.
Cheney had an important case pending in the Supreme Court. That outrage grew when
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Justice Scalia was allowed to remain on the case."); Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12 ("Justice Scalia, having lowered the bar for judicial ethics by
refusing to acknowledge the reasonableness of questions about his impartiality, has
guaranteed that the Supreme Court will end up embarrassed, no matter which way it
rules."); Editorial, The Justice in the Bubble, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at BlO ("Scalia
had already carved out his separate zone of ethics by refusing to recuse himself from
[Cheney] ....); Editorial, Justice Scalia Dodges Issue, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, Mar. 22, 2004, at B6, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("The public
has every reason to be concerned about Mr. Scalia's judicial temperament and his lack of
sensitivity, and to fear the precedent his refusal to recuse sets for the nation's judiciary.");
Editorial, Justice Scalia Off Target in Cheney Case, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 21,
2004, at 2F, availableat LEXIS, News & Business Library ("[By refusing to recuse,] Scalia
missed a chance to reassure the American people."); Editorial, Justice's Judgment Suspect,
ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR (Rockford, Ill.), Mar. 22, 2004, at 7A, available at LEXIS,
News & Business Library ("Scalia's refusal to step away from a case involving the vice
president damages the legitimacy of the court."); Brian H. Kehrl, The Task at Hand: Will
Cheney's Secret Energy Meetings See the Light?, IN THESE TIMES, May 10, 2004, at 13
("Despite the apparent conflict of interest, Cheney's duck-hunting buddy Justice Antonin
Scalia has refused to recuse himself from the case."); Steve Lambert, Scalia All Too
Willing to Duck Issue of Integrity, SAN BERNADINO SUN, Apr. 4, 2004, available at
LEXIS, News & Business Library ("What he fails to acknowledge is human nature - and
that he, Scalia, cannot win this one in the court of public opinion."); Editorial, The Law,
and the Justice, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 13, 2004, at A8,available at LEXIS,
News & Business Library ("Justice Scalia so arrogantly dismiss[ed] the notion that
refusing to recuse himself from a case involving his duck-hunting buddy, Vice President
Dick Cheney, suggested a conflict of interest."); Editorial, Lax Ethics on High Court,
PALM BEACH POST (Fla.), Mar. 21, 2004, at 2E, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library (criticizing the lax ethics and "bad judgment" of both Justice Scalia and Justice
Ginsburg for their extra-judicial activities); Ed Lowe, If It Looks Like a Duck ...,
NEWSDAY (N.Y. City), Mar. 24, 2004, at A8, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library ("Whether out of supreme arrogance or sublime stupidity, Scalia refused [to
recuse]."); Editorial, Mr. Cheney's Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A24
("When Justice Scalia's hunting trip became public, there were widespread calls for him to
recuse himself. The Supreme Court said that the decision was Mr. Scalia's, and that he
had chosen not to. That may resolve the question legally, but it remains troubling.");
Editorial, The Mystique of Blind Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 16, 2004, at 8
(suggesting that Justice Scalia should have recused himself in order "to avoid even the
appearance of a potential conflict of interest"); Not Ducking, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2004
("[T]he question is not whether Mr Scalia's impartiality has in fact been impaired, but
whether a reasonable person could think that it might have been. And, so far, he has not
fully convinced [commentators] that this was not the case."); Editorial, Panel to Study
Judicial Misconduct Is a Step in the Right Direction, HARTFORD COURANT, June 2, 2004,
availableat LEXIS, News & Business Library (arguing that Justice Scalia's participation in
Cheney makes him "tainted by conflict of interest"); The Question: To Recuse, or Not?,
CONN. L. TRIB., June 21, 2004, at 17, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library
("[Scalia's] lengthy justification deals with the technical legal issues surrounding recusal
and not with how it appears to a public that is increasingly cynical about the legal
system."); Editorial, Refusing to Recuse, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Mar. 21, 2004, at
2P, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("Justice Antonin Scalia's 21-page
explanation of why he refuses to recuse himself from a case involving Vice President Dick
Cheney after the two of them went duck-hunting proves that justice is more deaf than
blind."); Editorial, Scalia: Court's Credibility Needlessly at Risk, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 22, 2004, at 10A, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library
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included columnists and editorialists, as well as scholars 6 8 and
members of the bar.'69 That the opinion did not engender public
("Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia should save the court embarrassment and recuse
himself ....); Editorial, Scalia Reversing Himself?, PALM BEACH POST (Fla.), Apr. 13,
2004, at 10A, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia has revealed his tin ear for judicial ethics by refusing to recuse himself
.);Editorial, Scalia: What Do You Know About How It Looks?, JOURNAL &
COURIER (Lafayette, Ind.), Mar. 20, 2004, at 7A, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library ("Scalia's refusal [to recuse] appears suspect, at least."); Editorial, Scalia's Bizarre
Road Show, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Apr. 15, 2004, at A8 ("Scalia
stubbornly refuses to recuse himself, even though the hunting trip smells to high heaven
like a conflict of interest."); Editorial, Scalia's Quack Opinion, JOURNAL NEWS
(Westchester County, N.Y.), Mar. 20, 2004, at 6B, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library ("In refusing to recuse himself..., Scalia puts himself above ethical rules dictating
conduct for all who stand in judgment in robes."); Robert Scheer, Editorial, The Dangers
of a 'What the Heck' Vote, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at B13 (opining that Scalia's actions
in Cheney show that he is inclined to "green-light the actions of... [Bush, a] wildly activist
president"); Lisa Stein, Judging Judges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 7, 2004, at 13
(reporting "scorching criticism" of Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse); Editorial, Supreme
Arrogance, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 29, 2004, at B6, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library ("[Scalia's] stubborn refusal to [recuse himself] tarnishes not just him, but the
entire court."); Editorial, Supreme Court Needs More Ethics Scrutiny, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, May 28, 2004, at 16A, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library
("Regardless of what [Scalia and Cheney] talked about, we're uncomfortable with cozy
judicial-executive relationships. Even the suggestion of bias should compel a judge to
disqualify himself from a case."); Editorial, Supreme Court Should Revisit Rules on When
Members Face Conflicts of Interest, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Mar. 22, 2004, at
A6, availableat LEXIS, News & Business Library ("It's hard to see how the actions of Mr.
Cheney challenged in the case don't involve him personally."); Editorial, A Welcome
Study of Judicial Ethics, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June 14, 2004, at B6,
available at LEXIS, News & Business Library ("[Scalia's] duck-hunting excursions with
Dick Cheney while the vice president was involved in a case before the high court
rightfully alarm those concerned about judicial bias."). But see Scalia Shoots Down His
Critics, N.Y. POST, Mar. 21, 2004, at 28, available at LEXIS, News & Business Library
("[Scalia] makes a cogent and persuasive argument to justify his decision to stay on the
case....").
The geographic and ideological distribution of the criticizing papers argues against
the interpretation that the editorials represent a personal vendetta on the part of a few
influential publishers. Many of the editorials criticized Justice Scalia's actions at the same
time as the actions his colleague, Justice Ginsburg, whose jurisprudence is generally the
opposite of Scalia's. Thus, it would not be fair to characterize the response as simple
knee-jerk partisan politics.
168. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 4, at 235 ("Scalia's opinion denying the recusal
motion engages in fallacious arguments and misstates and misapplies the Federal
Disqualification Statute. A Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States owes
litigants, and the public, a greater respect for the law of the United States."); Paul
Campos, Scalia Ducking the Issue, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Mar. 30, 2004, at
31A, available at 2004 WLNR 1225530 ("[Scalia's memorandum] engages in 21 pages of
egotistical bluster and posturing, in the course of which he makes various claims that, as
lawyers say, don't pass the red-face test."); Stephen Gillers, Scalia's Flawed Judgment,
NATION, Apr. 19, 2004, at 21, 21 (arguing that Justice Scalia's memorandum creates
damage beyond Cheney case because "Scalia's opinion tells thousands of federal and state
judges that it can be OK to vacation with friends who have cases before them and to
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confidence is worthy of concern because one of the chief aims of
recusal law is to preserve the public's trust in the integrity of the
judicial system.17 °

It is not inconsistent to assert that the public reaction to the
memorandum is relevant while at the same time agreeing with Justice
Scalia's proposition that his recusal decision cannot rely on opinions
expressed in the national media. First, the editorials predating the
memorandum may have relied on erroneous information about the
trip, while editorials after Justice Scalia's memorandum benefited
More
from Justice Scalia's corrections to the popular account.7

importantly, allowing public opposition to have a determinative effect
on the recusal decision would compromise judicial independence,
while attention to ex post public reaction does not pose such a
danger.
To the extent that Justice Scalia's memorandum was a faithful
exercise of recusal law, the public reaction to that memorandum
accept the generosity of those friends while their cases are pending"); Ifill, supra note 23,
at 60 ("Scalia's justification for staying on the case despite his January duck-hunting trip
with the vice president reveals a major gap between the justice's perception of his actions
and the public's perception."); Rosen, supra note 114, at 14 ("[Scalia's memorandum] does
more to undermine public confidence in his own judicial temperament than did the duckhunting trip itself."); Robert Solomon, Powers Separation a Cause for Pause, CONN. L.
TRIB., May 10, 2004, at 18 ("Legal scholars criticized Justice Scalia's opinion as wrong, if
not intellectually dishonest. That a judge can go duck hunting with the plaintiff and then
decide his case impartially is a difficult notion for lawyers."). But see Ronald D. Rotunda,
Election-Year Hunting, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 30, 2004, http://www.nationalreview
("[T]he calls for Scalia's recusal-and
.com/comment/rotunda200403300900.asp
impeachment-have very little to do with justice and everything to do with politics.");
David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Ethics and the Supreme Court, COURIERJOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 28, 2004, at 1D (quoting professor Charles Fried
dismissing criticism of Scalia's actions in Cheney as "contemptible, election year
garbage").
169. See Richard L. Bazelon, Maybe the Justice Should Have Just Ducked Out, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2004, at 5 ("Scalia's role in obtaining special benefit for Cheney
from a person owning an energy exploration services company goes beyond simple
friendship and socializing. This factor, added to the timing and extent of private contact
afforded by the trip, suggests that Scalia's 'impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.' "); Gerry Cater, Washington DC: Judgment Day, LEGAL WEEK, Aug. 26,
http://www.legalweek.com/Viewitem.asp?id=21011 &keyword=
2004,
available at
washington ("[In the wake of Scalia's refusal to recuse,] the public was left with an
impression of a self-complacent judiciary unable or unwilling to impose the requirements
of independence and neutrality on itself."). But see Hansell Jordan, Scalia's Decision Is
Proper,DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 1, 2004, at 11A (defending Justice Scalia and his
actions in Cheney by drawing on author's experience as a law clerk to Scalia).
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. This is significant because cases discounting the importance of media accounts as a
barometer of public perception of partiality often point to the inaccuracies present in the
newspapers' reporting of the facts. See, e.g., supra note 161.
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suggests that recusal law as it currently exists in the Supreme Court is
not accomplishing one of its chief ends. 7 2 The increasing scrutiny of
other Justices' extrajudicial activities is further evidence of that
conclusion. Developments in the law and practice of recusal have
historically been motivated substantially by public reactions to
newsworthy judicial actions.'73 The outcry following the Cheney
episode should signal to the Court that further refinement of the
recusal procedure is appropriate.
The next Part proposes steps for improving the practice of
recusal in the Supreme Court, in light of Cheney.
III. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING RECUSAL PRACTICES IN THE
SUPREME COURT

In the closing pages of his memorandum, Justice Scalia focused
in on one of the central concerns of recusal law, public confidence in
the Court's decisions: "The people must have confidence in the
integrity of the Justices, and that cannot exist in a system that assumes
them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship or favor, and in an
atmosphere where the press will be eager to find foot-faults.

74

Justice Scalia's approach, then, for ensuring public confidence is to
presume categorically that a Justice is not corruptible by friendship or
favors. If there is little chance that a Justice will be disqualified on
the basis of friendship or favor, Justice Scalia's logic runs, there will
be scant incentive for the press to suggest that improprieties are
afoot. Thus, the public will be protected from the notion that the
Justices of the Supreme Court are corruptible and their confidence
will thereby be preserved.'75
While Justice Scalia's approach has the virtue of protecting the
Court's independence, it goes too far by seeking to protect the Court
from criticism altogether.
In this respect, Justice Scalia's
memorandum is symptomatic of an approach to recusal in the
Supreme Court that seeks to promote public confidence by keeping
the issue below the radar rather than by implementing concrete
procedures that would give the public good reason to be confident. A
more reasoned approach to promoting public confidence is not to
172. See supra Part I.A (explaining that one of the central policies of recusal law is
promoting public confidence in the judiciary).
173. Frank, supra note 28, at 744.
174. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913,928 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.).
175. See id. ("While the political branches can perhaps survive the constant baseless
allegations of impropriety that have become the staple of Washington reportage, this
Court cannot.").
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simply silence the critics by taking away their ability to point out
"foot-faults," but to allow the press to function vigorously and then
judge dispassionately the resulting allegations of bias.
Two principal ways for the Supreme Court to give the public
good reason to be confident are for Justices to consistently write
opinions regarding their recusal decisions and then to subject those
written decisions to review. The former promotes the development
of recusal case law, which allows the public to oversee the quality and
consistency of the Court's recusal decisions. The latter accounts for
the potential for error and self-interest in a recusal decision rendered
by the Justice whose impartiality is being questioned.
No new laws need be passed for these practices to be
implemented; the Court could make these changes to its procedures
entirely on its own.176

Although these measures would impose

additional duties on the Court, it is clear that the stakes are high.
Mounting scrutiny of the Justices' impartiality toward litigants
threatens the public confidence in the Court's integrity. The
recommended measures would make the Court's recusal decisions
more transparent and more disinterested. Equally important is that
the measures would not sacrifice the vigorous and independent
functioning of the Court in making Justices more accountable for
their recusal decisions.
A.

Require Written Opinions on the Recusal Decision
Justice Scalia's personal interest/official action dichotomy is the
central proposition from which the rest of his memorandum flowed.
As such, it is significant that Justice Scalia cited no authority to
support it.
This is a major failing not of Justice Scalia's
memorandum, but of recusal practices in the Supreme Court. Justice
Scalia could cite no precedent because there is no precedent: even if
this is the rule, it is not written in any recorded opinions. When
Justices recuse themselves, they do not reveal why.'7 7 When Justices

176. The first proposal requires no legislation, because the proposal merely seeks to
have Justices undertake substantive, written analyses of recusal issues in the place of the
current single-phrase pronouncements "Justice X did not participate" and "Motion to
recuse Justice X is denied." See infra Part III.A. The second proposal requires no
legislation because the practice of permitting the challenged Justice alone to decide the
recusal question is nothing more than a tradition of the Court. See infra note 189 and
accompanying text.
177. See supra Part I.D and accompanying notes (pointing out that it is rare for Justices
to explain their recusal decisions in a written opinion).
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refuse to recuse themselves, their decision is seldom challenged.17 8

Even when a party moves for recusal, the motion is nearly always
disposed of summarily, in a one-sentence denial.179 Thus, it is rare for
a Justice to issue a substantive opinion on recusal, whether in support
of recusal or against it. The result is that there is almost no recusal
case law in the Supreme Court, which denies the public a metric
against which to measure the propriety of a Justice's participation.18 °
Supreme Court Justices have widely varying records on
recusal. 81 A developed body of recusal case law would bring a

measure of uniformity to the Justices' recusal decisions. Enhancing
predictability would be to everyone's advantage: Justices could feel

more assured that their decision is correct, and parties could rest their
recusal motions on firmer precedential footing."8 Indeed, if there
were a previous case with similar circumstances in which a recusal
decision had been rendered, it would be unlikely that a recusal
motion would be necessary.1 83 Finally, the Justice would be able to
178. See supra Part I.D and accompanying notes (describing the tradition of etiquette
in the Supreme Court that inhibits most practitioners from challenging a Justice's recusal
decision).
179. See Ernest v. U.S. Att'y, 474 U.S. 1016 (1985) (denying motion to recuse Justice
Powell); Kerpelman v. Att'y Grievance Comm'n, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (denying motion to
recuse Chief Justice Burger); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) (mem. of
Rehnquist, J.) (elaborating for a full paragraph on why one Justice is deciding a motion
made to the full Court, but disposing of the substance of the fourteen-page motion and
response brief in one sentence); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 415 U.S. 945
(1974) (denying motion to recuse Justice Douglas); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
409 U.S. 1029 (1972) (denying motion to recuse Justices Powell and Rehnquist); Guy v.
United States, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (denying motion to recuse Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist); Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (denying motion to recuse Justice
Rehnquist); Huie v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Ala. State Bar, 400 U.S. 874 (1970) (denying
motion to recuse Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black). Notable exceptions to the onesentence dismissal characterization are Cheney and Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972)
(mem. of Rehnquist, J.), in both of which the challenged Justice issued a lengthy opinion
defending his participation.
180. The recusal opinions from lower federal courts are informative, but they do not
take account of the unique circumstances of the Supreme Court, see supra Part I.E, and
are therefore not as useful as other Justices' opinions on recusal.
181. See Tony Mauro, Decoding High Court Recusals, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1., 2004, at 1
(reporting great variance in the number of times each Justice has recused per year and
recounting comments of former law clerks that Justices have a broad range of methods for
deciding when to recuse).
182. Cf. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson,
J., concurring) ("[Recusal p]ractice of the Justices over the years has not been uniform,
and the diversity of attitudes to the question doubtless leads to some confusion as to what
the bar may expect and as to whether the action in any case is a matter of individual or
collective responsibility.").
183. See supra Part I.D (noting that § 455 is self-enforcing, so that the Justices normally
recuse themselves sua sponte).
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explain his position and the public would have the opportunity to
evaluate the reasoning of the Justice's recusal decision. As the case
law grows, public confidence in a Justice's decision could be reassured
if that decision was consistent with previous decisions rendered under
similar circumstances and subsequently reviewed. 1"
One question that arises under this recommendation is when a
Justice should be required to write an opinion on the recusal decision.
Requiring Justices to defend their participation in every case would
be both unrealistic and overly burdensome, because in most cases
there is simply no recusal issue to address. A more efficient approach
would be to only require written opinions when recusal is a close
question. However, this approach suffers from a debilitating lack of
enforceability: under such a regime, Justices would likely avoid
writing opinions by simply never recognizing recusal as a close
question.
Perhaps the best approach is to require a written opinion either
when Justices recuse themselves or whenever a party moves for
recusal. Requiring Justices to give reasons for their recusal when they
recuse themselves sua sponte lays a foundation of cases in which
recusal is appropriate, making the recusal decision clearer for later
cases presenting the same circumstances. Only requiring written
decisions when Justices recuse themselves sua sponte is not enough,
however, because it does nothing in cases where recusal is
appropriate but a Justice refuses to recuse.
Second, then, Justices should be required to defend their recusal
decision whenever a party moves for recusal. 18 5 Relying on the
adversarial process to compel recusal opinions has the benefit of
avoiding overbreadth. Because parties want to avoid angering the
Court with frivolous accusations of impropriety, 186 they would only
move for recusal when there is a strong factual and doctrinal basis for
disqualification. The primary difficulty with relying on the parties to
prompt recusal opinions is that they may not be in a position to know
the facts that would support a motion to recuse, even when those
facts are present. 187 Consequently, an important component of this
184. Note that Justice Scalia's discussion of the practices of former Supreme Court
Justices did not quite accomplish this, for the reasons discussed in Part II.A.3.
185. A written, substantive evaluation of recusal motions would be contrary to the
usual practice of one-sentence denials. See supra note 178.
186. See supra Part I.D (describing the tradition of etiquette in the Supreme Court that
inhibits most practitioners from challenging a Justice's recusal decision).
187. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 599 ("[F]ew, if any litigants in a pending case would
raise the recusal issue absent factual support, and often that fact base lies largely or
exclusively within the knowledge of the potentially affected Justice.").
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proposal is that Justices must be forthright in disclosing facts that
bear on the recusal analysis. 88
B.

Subject the Recusal Decision to Review

Much of the criticism of Justice Scalia's memorandum stemmed
from the fact that its author was the target of the recusal motion. 18 9
However, the tradition of permitting each Justice to make his or her
own decision on recusal is firmly entrenched in the Supreme Court.
Even when parties have attempted to outmaneuver the practice by
addressing their recusal motion to the full Court, the challenged
Justice has solely decided the motion. 9 Scholars have long criticized
this practice, 191 and even the courts have shown their skepticism about
its wisdom."g The practice seems to be at odds with one of the most
fundamental principles of judicial ethics, that "[n]o man should be a
188. Cf id. at 598 (arguing that the proper course in Laird v. Tatum would have been
for Justice Rehnquist to make full disclosure to the litigants of his involvement with the
subject matter of that case).
189. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Scalia Scoffs at Notion that He's Biased Toward Cheney,
USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2004, at 2A ("[Commenting on the Cheney case,] Northwestern
University law professor Steven Lubet, who specializes in legal ethics, says the practice of
having individual justices-rather than the full court-decide whether a conflict of interest
exists does not inspire public confidence."); Stephen Gillers, supra note 168, at 21 ("A
proverb tells us that no person should judge his or her own cause. Yet on this issue, at
least, the Justices judge themselves."); Ifill, supra note 23, at 60 ("Scalia's memo makes
clear that a justice is often not in the best position to determine whether his participation
in a case raises an appearance of bias.").
190. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
191. See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 559 (1994) (arguing that "[m]otions containing allegations of an
appearance of partiality should be decided by another judge" and that "the challenged
judge is perhaps the last person who should rule on the motion"); Bassett, supra note 23,
at 1234 ("This practice and procedure of having the challenged judge determine the
existence of a perceived bias undercuts the statute's effectiveness."); Leubsdorf, supra
note 39, at 242 (arguing that it is "bizarre" to require that "the very judge whose acts are
alleged to be warped by unconscious bias to decide whether there is an adequate showing
of bias"). Another commentator notes:
In essence, Supreme Court recusal practice provides an almost unique illustration
in American government of substantive law without force when applied to a
certain institution. A comprehensive statute applies to Justices, but the statute
may only be applied if the allegedly biased Justice voluntarily chooses to follow
the law faithfully. Where the Justice does not so choose, there exists no corrective
mechanism.
Stempel, supranote 34, at 642-43.
192. See In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe somewhat surprising
(and not entirely comfortable) reality is that the motion is addressed to, and must be
decided by, the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned .... Like it or not,
therefore, the responsibility for ruling on the ...motion [to disqualify] devolves on me
alone.").
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'
The inconsistency has been the source of
judge of his own case."193
Congressional consternation and discomfort as well.'94
Skepticism of recusal decisions rendered by the Justice whose
impartiality is being questioned is based in part on the doubt that any
judge is psychologically capable of ignoring his own interest in the
recusal determination. 195 Justice Scalia's highly defensive tone in his
Cheney memorandum gives credence to this concern. 196 Justice
Scalia's tone suggests that he perceived the recusal motion and the
public criticism of his trip as a personal affront.1" The offense he
took at the criticism may have precluded him from fairly evaluating
whether his impartiality could reasonably be questioned. It is
necessary to point out that to recognize this possibility is not to argue
that Justice Scalia is incompetent or unethical. To the contrary, the
argument is that this reaction is a natural psychological response. The
shortcoming, then, lies with the system, which gives final and
irreversible status to a decision that so clearly has the potential for
error. Review of the Justice's recusal decision would cure this
deficiency. 198
One of the best reasons for allowing the Justice to make the

recusal decision is that he is the person most fully informed about the
193. Stempel, supra note 34, at 592-93 (quoting Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8
Co. 114a, l18a (c.p. 1610)).
194. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. The Congressional discomfiture
seems to reach back to at least the last time the recusal statute was modified. See Judicial
Disqualification: Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 12 (1973) (statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh) ("Surely litigants who believe that they cannot get a fair trial before a particular
judge should not have to convince the very same judge of his bias.").
195. In re Bernard, 31 F.3d at 844 ("[H]uman nature being what it is, we would all like
to believe that no objective observer would ever doubt our impartiality.") Recognizing
these inherent limitations, Judge Kozinski describes how he relied on the advice of an
independent committee to assist him in rendering his decision not to recuse. See id. at
844-45.
196. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2004) (mem. of Scalia,
J.) (rejecting the argument that his acceptance of the flight disqualified him because "[i]f it
is reasonable to think that a Supreme Court Justice can be bought so cheap, the Nation is
in deeper trouble than I had imagined"); id. at 929 ("As the newspaper editorials
appended to the motion make clear, I have received a good deal of embarrassing criticism
and adverse publicity in connection with the matters at issue here--even to the point of
becoming (as the motion cruelly but accurately states) 'fodder for late-night
comedians.' "). On the other hand, these excerpts may simply be exemplary of Justice
Scalia's rather acerbic writing style.
197. See Jeffrey Rosen, supra note 114, at 14 (arguing that even though Justice Scalia's
participation in Cheney is defensible, the "overly combative" tone of his memorandum
spoiled its persuasiveness).
198. Professor Stempel has also advocated full Court review of Supreme Court recusal
decisions. See Stempel, supra note 34, at 654-56.

2005]

HUNTING FOR BETTER RECUSAL PRACTICES

facts underlying the alleged bias
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The value of this practice became

clear in Cheney, where Justice Scalia's account of the trip differed in
important respects from the facts as reported in the media and the
recusal motion.2 °° Once the Justice's version of the facts is known,
however, there is little reason to protect his decision from review.
Moreover, there is some indication that the other Justices on the
Court already exercise a degree of influence on each others' recusal
decisions.2 1 This review should be done above-board, by allowing
parties to appeal a Justice's recusal decision to the full Court.20 2

Some may be concerned that other Justices will use the review as
an opportunity to eliminate Justices who would likely vote differently

from them. Leaving aside the argument that few Supreme Court
Justices would be so brazen, it would be against a Justice's own
interest to follow that practice because he may be the subject of a

recusal motion in the next action.

Thus, even a Justice who was

motivated solely by self-interest would confine his review of the

recusal decision to its merits.
More realistically, Justices may find it distasteful to sit in
judgment of their colleagues. 2 3 However, if the § 455(a) standard is
correctly understood, Justices should not view this as an attack on
199. See In re Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1358 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[The
recusal decision is committed to the judge] because [t]he judge presiding over a case is in
the best position to appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal
motion." (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir.
1988))).
200. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 923-24 (mem. of Scalia, J.).
201. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (statement of
Rehnquist, C.J., respecting recusal) ("I have therefore considered at length whether [my
son's] representation [of Microsoft] requires me to disqualify myself on the Microsoft
matters currently before this court. I have reviewed the relevant legal authorities and
consulted with my colleages.") (emphasis added); An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (responding to an interviewer's question
whether Justices make recusal decisions individually: "In the end it is a decision the
individual Justice makes, but always with consultation among the rest of us."). But see
Stempel, supra note 34, at 641 ("Only rarely is there evidence of unofficial attention to
recusal orders by the other Justices. In fact, unofficial review by the other Justices
through jawboning may more frequently work to prevent recusal.").
202. Minus, of course, the Justice whose opinion is the subject of the appeal. Because
eight Justices are left, this sets up the possibility of an evenly split vote. However, even in
those probably rare instances where that would occur, it would be more satisfactory to
have a Justice's questionable recusal decision affirmed by a split panel than to have no
review at all. See also Stempel, supra note 34, at 654-56 (articulating the need for full
Court review of a Justice's recusal decision).
203. Bassett, supra note 23, at 1237; see also Stempel, supra note 34, at 643 ("The
closed atmosphere of the Court seems an unlikely atmosphere from which reform will
grow. The past failure of the Court to prevent occasionally gross ethical lapses suggests
the body will not reform itself.").
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their colleagues: an evaluation of the appearances of bias from the
perspective of a reasonable person says nothing about whether those
Furthermore, where the question is
biases actually exist. °4
appearance of bias rather than actual bias, other Justices are probably
better equipped than the challenged Justice to evaluate the validity of
the allegations. 0 5
CONCLUSION

Recusal law aims to achieve both impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality. The Cheney episode indicates that the
second goal is not being met by the Supreme Court's current recusal
practices. Furthermore, the public outcry following Cheney seems to
be part of a growing trend of accusations of bias in the nation's
highest court. This growing culture of skepticism suggests a need to
reexamine the Court's recusal practices and procedures. Because of
the Supreme Court's unique position, any reforms to its recusal
practices must strike a balance between preserving the Court's
integrity by promoting public trust in its impartiality and allowing the
Court to continue to function vigorously and independently.
Requiring Justices to write opinions respecting their recusal decisions,
and then subjecting those decisions to review by the full panel,
effectively strikes that balance and gives the public a meaningful
procedure on which to base their confidence in the judicial process.
TIMOTHY

J. GOODSON

204. See supra Part I.B.
205. This follows from the fact that appearances are to be evaluated from the
standpoint of a disinterested third party and the other Justices are further removed from
the case than the Justice whose impartiality is in question.

